1. Purpose
The CHLOM Metaprotocol is the foundational, cross-environment, identity-aware coordination layer that binds TLaaS (LEX), TLAAS (DLA), and DAL under a unified governance, compliance, and licensing automation framework. It establishes universal standards for rule enforcement, data flow, and interoperability, functioning as a multi-protocol bridge that connects Web2, Web3, multi-chain networks, decentralized identity (DID) frameworks, multi-sig with biometric and fingerprint authentication, and legacy enterprise systems. Its purpose is to enable secure, synchronized, and verifiable governance, licensing, and compliance operations across diverse trust layers and execution environments.
2. Design Principles
- Layered Architecture: Separate execution, compliance, governance, identity, and biometric layers with standardized APIs.
- Universal Connectivity: Native bridge modules for Web2, Web3, multi-chain, and enterprise integrations.
- DID-First Identity Model: Built-in DID registry, verifiable credential (VC) management, and selective disclosure protocols.
- Biometric Assignment & Validation: Fingerprint templates, behavioral biometrics, and multi-factor authentication embedded in protocol flows.
- Inter-Protocol Messaging: Encrypted, signed, and versioned messages enabling trustless communication across chains and systems.
- Deterministic State Synchronization: Ensures canonical state alignment between TLaaS, TLAAS, DAL, and all connected identity services.
- Upgradeability: Modular, governance-driven upgrades with rollback and migration strategies.
3. Core Functional Components
- Metaprotocol Router — Authenticated call routing between TLaaS, TLAAS, and DAL.
- Compliance Relay Layer — Applies DLA-driven enforcement policies to all LEX transactions.
- Governance Adapter — Translates DAL proposals into executable instructions.
- Cross-Environment Bridge — Anchors proofs, credentials, and compliance attestations across blockchain, Web2 APIs, and hybrid stacks.
- Multi-Sig Biometric Orchestrator — Integrates fingerprint, hardware keys, and distributed signature coordination.
- DID & Credential Services — Handles issuance, resolution, verification, and revocation of decentralized identifiers.
- Fingerprint Identity Ledger — Associates biometric hashes with DIDs, providing on-chain proof of identity binding.
4. Extended Capabilities
- DID Registry: On-chain/off-chain DID resolution.
- Verifiable Credential Lifecycle: Issuance, revocation, renewal, and selective presentation.
- Fingerprint Enrollment & Revocation: Secure hashing and binding of biometric data to DID.
- Inter-Bridge Compatibility: IBC, W3C DID standards, OAuth2/OIDC integration.
- Off-Chain to On-Chain Proofs: Oracle-assisted event verification.
- Programmable Governance Hooks: DID and biometric conditions for governance participation.
- Behavioral Analytics Integration: Detects anomalous user patterns for fraud prevention.
5. Data Flow Overview
graph LR
A[DAL Governance Decision] -->|Executes| B[Governance Adapter]
B --> C[TLaaS License Actions]
B --> D[TLAAS Compliance Enforcement]
C --> E[Cross-Chain / Web2 Proof Anchor]
D --> E
E --> F[DID Credential & Fingerprint Verification]
F --> G[Multi-Sig Biometric Validation]
6. Solidity Metaprotocol Router (Example)
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
interface ITLaaS {
function executeLicenseAction(bytes calldata data) external;
}
interface ITLAAS {
function enforceCompliance(bytes calldata data) external;
}
interface IDIDRegistry {
function verifyCredential(bytes calldata vc) external returns (bool);
}
interface IFingerprintRegistry {
function verifyFingerprint(bytes calldata fpHash, address subject) external returns (bool);
}
contract CHLOMRouter {
address public tlaas;
address public tlaasCompliance;
address public didRegistry;
address public fingerprintRegistry;
constructor(address _tlaas, address _tlaasCompliance, address _didRegistry, address _fingerprintRegistry) {
tlaas = _tlaas;
tlaasCompliance = _tlaasCompliance;
didRegistry = _didRegistry;
fingerprintRegistry = _fingerprintRegistry;
}
function route(bytes calldata actionData, bool isCompliance, bytes calldata credential, bytes calldata fingerprintHash) external {
require(IDIDRegistry(didRegistry).verifyCredential(credential), "Invalid Credential");
require(IFingerprintRegistry(fingerprintRegistry).verifyFingerprint(fingerprintHash, msg.sender), "Invalid Fingerprint");
if (isCompliance) {
ITLAAS(tlaasCompliance).enforceCompliance(actionData);
} else {
ITLaaS(tlaas).executeLicenseAction(actionData);
}
}
}
7. Governance, DID & Biometric Integration
- All upgrades, parameter changes, and bridge integrations are DAL-governed.
- Governance proposals can require both DID and fingerprint verification for quorum eligibility.
- Compliance and licensing actions must pass DID + biometric verification before execution.
- Fingerprints can be assigned to multiple DIDs for multi-role users while maintaining audit trails.
8. Security Considerations
- DID-bound, fingerprint-verified role-based access control.
- Multi-factor authentication combining biometric, hardware, and credential-based keys.
- Zero-trust endpoint policies for bridge and oracle connections.
- Merkle-proof anchored biometric & credential verification.
- Emergency governance “kill switch” for full protocol halt.
9. Acceptance Criteria
- Fully operational DID + fingerprint registry across TLaaS, TLAAS, and DAL.
- Biometric assignment and revocation supported at protocol level.
- Cross-environment interoperability proven across Web2, Web3, and multi-chain.
- End-to-end governance, licensing, and compliance bound to identity verification.
10. Biometric Fingerprint Identity Layer (Assigned, Bound, and Governed)
To meet high-assurance requirements, the Metaprotocol treats fingerprints as assigned biometric factors that are cryptographically bound to a subject’s DID and governed by DAL policies.
10.1 Design Tenets
- No Raw Biometrics On-Chain: Only store public keys, salted/minutiae hashes, or ZK commitments derived from templates.
- Multi-Factor by Default: Fingerprint + device key + (optional) passphrase or recovery code.
- Portable but Revocable: Fingerprint factors are assignable across devices via DID proofs; rapid revocation and re‑enrollment supported.
- Attested Enrollment: Device- or sensor-level attestation (TEE/SE) is required to register a new fingerprint factor.
10.2 Enrollment & Attestation Flow (Web2/Web3 Hybrid)
- Capture & Match (Local): Mobile/desktop SDK captures fingerprint; local matcher computes a template and a ZK-friendly commitment (e.g., Poseidon hash).
- Device Attestation: The authenticator produces an attestation statement (WebAuthn/FIDO2 or platform TEE) binding template commitment → device public key.
- DID Binding: The attestation is wrapped in a W3C Verifiable Credential (VC) and signed by an issuer trusted by DAL.
- On-Chain Anchor: A short record (commitment, device pubkey hash, VC hash) is anchored in the BiometricRegistry for audit and policy checks.
10.3 Revocation, Rotation, Re‑Enrollment
- Revocation: Any factor can be invalidated on-chain by holder (with alternate factor) or by DAL after dispute.
- Rotation: Fingerprint factor replaced with new commitment and device key while preserving DID continuity.
- Recovery: Guardianship or multi-party recovery (DAL/TLAAS validators + recovery contacts) to restore access without revealing biometrics.
11. DID + Fingerprint Credential Model (W3C VC with Selective Disclosure)
11.1 VC Schema (JSON-LD, illustrative)
{
"@context": ["https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1", "https://w3id.org/security/suites/jws-2020/v1"],
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "BiometricBindingCredential"],
"issuer": "did:chlom:issuer:abc123",
"issuanceDate": "2025-08-09T00:00:00Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:chlom:user:0x456...",
"fingerprint": {
"commitment": "0xPOSEIDON_COMMITMENT",
"deviceKey": "0xDEVICE_PUBKEY",
"sensorAttestation": "base64(attestationObject)",
"livenessScore": 0.98,
"policy": { "mfaRequired": true, "expiry": "2026-08-09T00:00:00Z" }
}
},
"proof": { "type": "JsonWebSignature2020", "jws": "eyJ..." }
}
11.2 Selective Disclosure & ZK
- Holders present only the minimum required claims (e.g., “livenessScore ≥ 0.9”) using BBS+ or ZK range proofs.
- No template leakage: Verifiers learn commitment validity, not minutiae.
12. On-Chain Biometric Registry (Reference Solidity)
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
import {AccessControl} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
interface IZKMatcher { function verify(bytes calldata proof, bytes32 commitment) external view returns (bool); }
contract BiometricRegistry is AccessControl {
bytes32 public constant GOVERNANCE_ROLE = keccak256("GOVERNANCE_ROLE");
bytes32 public constant ISSUER_ROLE = keccak256("ISSUER_ROLE");
struct Factor {
bytes32 commitment; // ZK-friendly hash of fingerprint template
bytes32 deviceKeyHash; // hash of device public key
bytes32 vcHash; // VC content hash
uint64 enrolledAt;
bool active;
}
// subject DID (hashed) => factor id => factor
mapping(bytes32 => mapping(uint256 => Factor)) public factors;
mapping(bytes32 => uint256) public factorCount;
event FactorEnrolled(bytes32 indexed did, uint256 indexed fid, bytes32 commitment, bytes32 deviceKeyHash);
event FactorRevoked(bytes32 indexed did, uint256 indexed fid);
event FactorRotated(bytes32 indexed did, uint256 indexed fidOld, uint256 indexed fidNew);
function enroll(bytes32 didHash, bytes32 commitment, bytes32 deviceKeyHash, bytes32 vcHash) external returns (uint256 fid) {
fid = ++factorCount[didHash];
factors[didHash][fid] = Factor(commitment, deviceKeyHash, vcHash, uint64(block.timestamp), true);
emit FactorEnrolled(didHash, fid, commitment, deviceKeyHash);
}
function revoke(bytes32 didHash, uint256 fid) external {
Factor storage f = factors[didHash][fid];
require(f.active, "ALREADY_REVOKED");
f.active = false; emit FactorRevoked(didHash, fid);
}
}
13. Biometric Multi‑Sig Policy Orchestration
13.1 Policy Examples
- P1 (High‑Value Ops): M-of-N device keys AND ≥1 active fingerprint factor AND DID VC validity check.
- P2 (Routine Ops): 1 device key OR fingerprint factor with liveness proof within last 24h.
- P3 (Emergency Recovery): 2 guardians + DAL validator quorum, fingerprint bypass but DID proof required.
13.2 Enforcement Hook (Excerpt)
interface IPolicy {
function authorize(bytes32 didHash, bytes calldata packedEvidence) external view returns (bool);
}
contract BiometricPolicyGate {
IPolicy public policy;
function gate(bytes32 didHash, bytes calldata evidence) external view returns (bool) {
return policy.authorize(didHash, evidence);
}
}
14. Bridge Connectors (Web2, Web3, Multi‑Chain)
- Web2 Adapter: Signed webhooks/OAuth2 JWTs mapped to DIDs; replay‑protected with nonces and TTL.
- Web3 Adapter: EVM event relays + light clients; message signatures recorded with domain separation (EIP‑712).
- Multi‑Chain: IBC‑style or generic message bus; proof-of-inclusion verified on target chain.
- Enterprise: SAML/OIDC federation → DID issuance; SCIM for lifecycle; hardware HSM-backed keys.
15. Privacy, Compliance, and Safety
- Template Privacy: Only commitments and ZK proofs flow on-chain; templates remain device/TEE‑confined.
- Liveness & PAD: Presentation‑attack detection (PAD) scores embedded in VC; policy thresholds governed by DAL.
- Data Subject Rights: VC revocation registries + audit trails; exportable logs via IPFS/Arweave.
- Jurisdictional Controls: TLAAS enforces geo‑policies pre‑transaction using DID claims.
16. Threat Model & Mitigations
- Replay: Nonce + expiry on every credential presentation.
- Compromised Device: Fast revoke/rotate; require second factor and DAL attestation for re‑enroll.
- Template Inversion: Store only salted commitments; ZK matching; rate‑limited verification endpoints.
- Rogue Bridge: Endpoint allow‑lists, TLS pinning, and on‑chain attestation of bridge keys.
17. Operational Runbook (Biometric Factors)
- Quarterly factor rotation campaigns; automated reminders via ThrivePush.
- Periodic liveness re‑validation; auto‑suspend factors failing checks.
- Independent sensor attestation audits; revoke non‑compliant devices.
18. Expanded Acceptance Criteria
- ≥1 active fingerprint factor assigned per high‑assurance DID, anchored on-chain with valid VC hash.
- ZK proof verification integrated in compliance pathways (≤500k gas).
- End‑to‑end bridge flows validated across Web2/Web3/multi‑chain with DID + biometric policy gates.
- Revocation/rotation SLAs met (<15 minutes to full propagation).
Next: CHLOM Metaprotocol — Governance-Licensing Synchronization Architecture (2/30)