CHLOM™ Technical White Paper — Protocol, Cryptography, Economics, and Verification

Version 1.0 • August 10, 2025 • CrownThrive, LLC • [email protected] • Patent Pending

This document specifies CHLOM (Compliance Hybrid Licensing & Ownership Model) at the engineering level: protocol flows, data schemas, cryptographic assumptions, economic game‑theory, governance, and formal verification. It complements the CHLOM BlackPaper (v1.3) hosted in this workspace.

Abstract

CHLOM is a protocol for decentralized licensing, attribution, and compliant revenue distribution. It composes (i) ZK‑gated policy checks, (ii) tree‑based override payouts, and (iii) calibrated staking/slashing under a BFT ledger. We formalize the target properties (safety, liveness, privacy, conservation, attribution uniqueness, incentive‑compatibility), specify mechanisms that realize them, and bind the design to machine‑checkable artifacts (TLA+, Foundry tests).

1. Problem & Objectives

Digital licensing is fragmented and hard to enforce without revealing private usage data. CHLOM provides:

• Verifiable compliance without exposing raw data (ZK predicates). • Deterministic, auditable payout calculation with override hierarchies. • Governance with due process and negative‑EV misreporting. • Cross‑chain portability under light‑client finality proofs. • Formal methods to reduce ambiguity and catch edge cases before deployment.

2. System Overview

Actors: creators, licensees, sublicensees, validators, analytics oracles (A), violation oracles (V), DLA governance. Components: License, Splitter, Override Tree, Registry, Treasury, Governance, ZK Verifier, Parameter Registry.

Lifecycle: onboarding → license activation → ZK‑gated usage → capacity guard → settlement → audit logging → dispute/appeal if needed.

3. Architecture

3.1 Component responsibilities

License: enforce capacity and state transitions. Splitter: fixed‑point weights; residual policy. Override Tree: path‑product payout modifiers; subtree revocation. Registry: DID ↔ keys/roles. Treasury: receipt of base amounts; disbursements; residual sink. Governance (DLA): violations, votes, slashing, reinstatement. ZK Verifier: on‑chain verification of policy proofs. Parameter Registry: quorum/thresholds, deposits, slashing, timing.

3.2 Data flow (high level)

Client → Prover (off‑chain x) → ZK proof π → On‑chain Verify → License.Usage++ →
Splitter/Override → Treasury disburse → Receipts → Audit log → (optional) DLA case

4. Protocol Specification

4.1 Onboarding

  1. Creator registers DID and roles in Registry.
  2. Creator deploys License(L0) with (cap, weights, treeRoot, residualPolicy).
  3. Governance confirms eligibility; License moves from Draft → Active.

4.2 Usage reporting and compliance gate

  1. Holder computes proof for policy predicate C(x).
  2. Submit (licenseId, Δ, π, vk) to License.
  3. Contract checks nonce, cap, and VerifyZK(π, vk) before state and payouts.

4.3 Settlement

  1. For base B, compute pays via Splitter (weights) and Override Tree (path multipliers).
  2. Apply rounding; send residual r to deterministic sink.
  3. Emit per‑tx receipts and Merkle anchors for audit.

4.4 Dispute & governance

Reporter posts deposit; DLA opens case; evidence window; vote; resolve (slash/reward). Subtree revocation disables flows to affected branch; finalized payouts are immutable.

5. Data Model & Interfaces

5.1 Core structs (canonical)

struct License { bytes32 id; uint256 cap; uint256 used; uint64 nonce; uint8 state; bytes32 ownerDID; }
struct Splitter { bytes32 id; bytes32 licenseId; bytes32 weightsHash; }
struct Payout { bytes32 id; bytes32 licenseId; uint256 base; bytes32 weightsHash; bytes32 overridePathHash; bytes32 receiptId; }
struct Receipt { bytes32 id; bytes32 txHash; uint64 block; bytes32 verifierHash; bytes32 actorDID; }
struct Violation { bytes32 id; bytes32 licenseId; bytes32 reporter; bytes32 respondent; bytes32 evidenceHash; uint64 filedAt; }

5.2 Events (logs)

event UsageAdvanced(bytes32 licenseId, uint256 delta, uint64 nonce, bytes32 verifierHash);
event PayoutSettled(bytes32 licenseId, uint256 base, bytes32 weightsHash, bytes32 overridePathHash, uint256 residual);
event CaseOpened(bytes32 caseId, bytes32 reporter, bytes32 respondent);
event CaseResolved(bytes32 caseId, uint8 decision, uint256 penalty, uint256 reward);

5.3 External methods (minimum)

createLicense(cap, weightsHash, treeRoot, residualPolicy)
recordUsage(licenseId, Δ, π, vk)
disburse(licenseId, base)
revokeSubtree(licenseId, subtreeRoot)
submitViolation(licenseId, evidenceHash) payable
resolveCase(caseId)

6. Cryptography & Identity

6.1 Assumptions

H : {0,1}* → {0,1}^k  (collision‑resistant)

EUF‑CMA signature scheme (Sign, Verify)

Zero‑knowledge proof system: sound and zero‑knowledge

6.2 DIDs

DID = H(pk ∥ salt)

Public; used for attribution and auth. Internal fingerprints, if any, remain off‑chain and private.

6.3 ZK predicate interface

Input: statement y (policy tag), witness x (private), CRS or vk
Guarantee: Verify(π, vk) = ⊤ ⇒ C(x) holds; no leakage beyond validity

Example predicates: age ≥ threshold; geo ∈ allowlist; model risk ≤ τ; KYC attestation hash in registry.

7. Settlement Math & Rounding

7.1 Splitter

Σ_i w_i = 1  and  w_i ≥ 0

Payout_i = ⌊w_i · B⌋;  residual r = B − Σ_i Payout_i;  0 ≤ r ≤ m − 1

7.2 Override Tree

For a node u on the unique path to leaf ℓ: 

Alloc(u) = B · Π_{e ∈ path(u→ℓ)} r_e

Global conservation holds by telescoping sum.

8. Economics & Game Theory

8.1 Single‑actor deviation

EU = G − p · s · S  ⇒  deviation non‑profitable if  S ≥ G/(p s)

8.2 Oracle accountability

EV(misreport) = benefit_lie − p_detect · s_V · S_V  < 0

8.3 Collusion thresholds (BFT)

Censorship < 1/3; safety break > 2/3. Set slashing so a rational coalition’s expected utility is negative.

9. Governance (DLA)

Roles: Council, Validators, Oracles (A/V), Reporter, Respondent, Treasury. Parameters: quorum q, threshold θ, emergency θ_E, evidence/appeal windows, deposits S_V, slashing s_V, reward R. Liveness: time‑boxed stages; emergency powers require higher θ_E and documented rationale.

10. Formal Methods & Verification

Artifacts: TLA+ spec for invariants I1–I9 and liveness; TLC models with bounded constants; Foundry property tests for splitter conservation, rounding residual, cap guard, replay resistance, order invariance, subtree revocation, ZK gate.

Outputs: counterexample traces; invariant certificates; gas‑aware unit tests.

11. Security Analysis

Threats: MEV reordering, false oracle evidence, colluding validators, replay attempts, rounding manipulation, bridge forgery. Mitigations: batch‑order invariance, deposits/slashing, nonce monotonicity, deterministic residuals, light‑client verification.

12. Performance & Cost Considerations

Guidelines: pack events; pre‑hash weight vectors and paths; minimize storage writes; prefer Merkle anchors over raw blobs; batch disbursements consistent with order invariance. Gas cost depends on chain; target O(m) payout with precomputed hashes.

13. Interoperability & Bridging

Bridging strategy: mint on chain Y only upon verified finality proof from chain X. Maintain mirrored audit logs; treat bridge as an additional assumption.

14. Privacy Boundaries

Only ZK validity bits and salted identifiers are on‑chain. Avoid logging sensitive selectors that could enable inference; use coarse tags where possible.

15. Implementation Roadmap (Phases)

Phase 0: Specs, proofs, TLC/Foundry scaffolds. Phase 1: Core contracts (License, Splitter, Treasury, Registry); basic ZK verifier. Phase 2: DLA governance MVP; parameter registry; receipts and audit. Phase 3: Override Tree tooling; subtree revocation; oracle staking. Phase 4: Cross‑chain bridging with light‑client proofs. Phase 5: Performance optimizations; advanced circuits; external audits.

16. API Sketches

16.1 Contract methods

function createLicense(uint256 cap, bytes32 weightsHash, bytes32 treeRoot, uint8 residualPolicy) external returns (bytes32 id)

function recordUsage(bytes32 id, uint256 delta, bytes calldata proof, bytes calldata vk) external

function disburse(bytes32 id, uint256 base) external

function revokeSubtree(bytes32 id, bytes32 subtreeRoot) external

function submitViolation(bytes32 id, bytes32 evidenceHash) external payable

16.2 Off‑chain receipt format (example)

{
  "licenseId": "0x…",
  "txHash": "0x…",
  "block": 12345678,
  "verifierHash": "0x…",
  "actorDID": "0x…",
  "weightsHash": "0x…",
  "overridePathHash": "0x…",
  "residual": 1
}

17. Ecosystem Fit (CrownThrive)

CHLOM integrates with the CrownThrive ecosystem, enabling compliant attribution and payouts for: FindCliques, NFTCliques, ChainCliques, CrownThrive IO, CrownLytics, CrownPulse, ThrivePush, ThriveTickets, Thrive AI Studio, ThriveTools, Kamora360, Go‑Flipbooks, Collab Portal, CrownRewards, CrownFluence, Crown Affiliates & Ambassadors, AdLuxe Network, The Mane Experience, Locticians, Locticians TV, Melanin Magic, CrownThriveU, The Tame Gallery, The Artful Mane Gallery, Wearable Art (Legaleriste), Melanated Voices Platform (MVP on Roku), Melanated Voices TV, XENthrive (incl. ThriveSeat, ThriveThreads, Good Shit Only). See crownthrive.com for current offerings.

18. Compliance & Auditability

All state transitions emit receipts referencing finalized blocks and verifier hashes. The parameter registry and change log are versioned and auditable. Deterministic residual policy avoids discretionary leakage.

19. References

• CHLOM BlackPaper — Formal Proof & Verification Master (v1.3). • TLC Model: CHLOM_TLC_Min.tla (download link in Appendix P of BlackPaper). • Foundry Scaffold: foundry_chlom_scaffold.zip (download link in Appendix P of BlackPaper).

Appendix A — Additional Mathematical Notes

A.1 Batch‑order invariance

P_i = Σ_j w_i^(j) B_j  ⇒  permutation σ or batching partition does not change Σ_j w_i^(j) B_j

A.2 Rounding bound derivation

Σ_i ⌊x_i⌋ ≥ ⌊Σ_i x_i⌋ − (m − 1)  with  Σ_i x_i = B  ⇒  r < m  and  r ∈ ℕ ⇒ r ≤ m − 1

A.3 Coalition rationality

G_coalition ≤ s · S_coalition  ⇒  choose s high enough so expected EV ≤ 0 under plausible gains

Appendix B — ASCII Diagrams

B.1 Entity/Contract map

Creator → License → Splitter → Treasury → Receipts
             |            ^
             v            |
          ZK Verify ← Oracles(A)
             |
        Governance (DLA) ← Oracles(V)

B.2 Governance flow

OpenCase → EvidenceWindow → Vote(θ) → Resolve{Slash/Reward, Suspend, Revoke} → Appeal?

Legal

All algorithms, schemas, state machines, and proofs herein are proprietary to CrownThrive, LLC and protected under pending patents and trade secret law. This white paper is provided for technical evaluation and audit enablement.

These appendices expand the main CHLOM Technical White Paper with deeper engineering detail. They add content and do not modify existing sections.

Appendix C — Gas‑Cost Budgeting & Complexity Envelopes (EVM focus)

Scope

Estimated gas envelopes assume Solidity 0.8.24, EVM Paris, warm SLOAD/SSTORE patterns, and pre‑hashed vectors/paths. Actual costs vary with m (recipients) and path length h.

Function envelopes (targets)

recordUsage (nonce check, cap guard, event only) 

O(1) state reads/writes; target 30–45k gas

disburse (Splitter + residual; no override tree) 

O(m) arithmetic; target ~11k base + 5k·m gas

disburseWithTree (Splitter + path‑product over height h) 

O(m + h) arithmetic; target ~13k base + 5k·m + 2.5k·h gas

revokeSubtree (mark nodes via mapping/bitmap; event) 

O(k) for k nodes updated; single‑root flag design ⇒ O(1) write, target 35–50k gas

submitViolation (with deposit transfer) 

O(1); target 30–40k gas (ex‑transfer)

resolveCase (slash/reward + state move) 

O(1); target 45–70k gas

Complexity summary 

Splitter payout:    O(m)
Override traversal: O(h)
Usage advance:      O(1)
Governance steps:   O(1)

Optimization notes

Pre‑hash weights and overridePath into bytes32. Use unchecked loops. Pack small fields to reduce SSTOREs. Emit single consolidated PayoutSettled with hashes.

Appendix D — Storage Layout & Slot Packing Strategy

Layout principles

  1. Hot vs cold: keep frequently touched fields in the same slot group.
  2. Pack: use
  3. Hash‑first: store hashes of large arrays/paths; keep canonical off‑chain artifacts.

Suggested packing (License) 

slot[0]: uint64 nonce | uint64 state | uint128 reserved
slot[1]: uint256 cap
slot[2]: uint256 used
slot[3]: bytes32 ownerDID
slot[4]: bytes32 weightsHash
slot[5]: bytes32 treeRoot

ABI & events 

event UsageAdvanced(bytes32 licenseId, uint256 delta, uint64 nonce, bytes32 verifierHash);
event PayoutSettled(bytes32 licenseId, uint256 base, bytes32 weightsHash, bytes32 overridePathHash, uint256 residual);

Index licenseId and verifierHash for fast audit queries.

Appendix E — ZK Circuit Specification (Interface & Constraints)

Interface 

Public inputs: policyTag, verifierHash, timestampBucket, actorDID
Witness: x (private usage data)
Guarantee: Verify(π, vk) = 1 ⇒ C(x) holds for policyTag; no leakage beyond validity

Constraint families (examples) 

Age ≥ 18:    x.birthdate + 18y ≤ nowBucket
Geo allow:   Poseidon(geoCode) ∈ MerkleRoot_allow
Risk bound:  score(x) ≤ τ  (rank‑1 constraints over fixed model)
KYC att:     hash(attestation) ∈ MerkleRoot_KYC

SRS & security level

Use a universal SRS (Plonkish) with ≥ 2^128 soundness. Publish vk hash on‑chain; rotate via Parameter Registry.

Appendix F — Trusted Setup, SRS Rotation, and vk Governance

Setup

Universal SRS ceremony or adoption from a reputable source. Document transcript and powers of tau.

Rotation

Version vk by content hash. Store active vk IDs in the Parameter Registry; allow emergency revoke/replace via DLA with θ_E.

Audits

Independent audits on circuits and transcript verification. Maintain reproducible builds for provers.

Appendix G — MEV & Ordering Analysis

Threat

Searchers reorder transactions to skew micro‑allocations or delay enforcement.

Defense

Batch‑order invariance (math): totals per recipient depend only on sums Σ_j w_i^(j) B_j. 

Formal: Σ over commutative monoid (ℝ_≥0, +) ⇒ permutation invariance

Receipts

Per‑tx receipts ensure disputants can verify inclusion even if micro‑level timing differs.

Appendix H — Cross‑Chain Bridging & Light‑Client Proofs

Design

Mint settlement artifacts on chain Y only upon verified finality proof from chain X.

Light clients (options) 

Ethereum→L2: beacon light client (SSZ root) with finalized header
IBC‑style: Tendermint light client with validator set changes
SPV: PoW/PoS headers + inclusion proofs (chain‑specific)

Safety

Bridge as additional assumption; slashing on relayer misbehavior; rate limits on mints.

Appendix I — Security Model & Attack Trees

High‑level trees 

Goal: Misallocate funds
  ├─ Splitter math bug → property tests block
  ├─ Override leak after revoke → subtree guard
  └─ Rounding drift → residual cap + audit

Goal: Bypass compliance
  ├─ Fake proof → on‑chain verifier
  ├─ vk swap → registry governance
  └─ Side‑channel → minimal public inputs

Goal: Censor enforcement
  ├─ Miner/validator collusion (<1/3) → liveness holds
  └─ >2/3 rewrite → economically irrational via slashing

Appendix J — Monte‑Carlo EV Models (Calibration)

Model 

Inputs: G ~ distribution; p_detect ~ Beta(α,β); s ~ policy; S ~ stake
EV = E[G] − E[p_detect] · s · S

Procedure

Sample 10k scenarios; ensure EV ≤ 0 at 95% CI. Publish recommended S for each role.

Appendix K — Test Vectors (Splitter & Rounding)

Vector 1 

B=1,234,567; w=[0.2,0.3,0.5] (1e18 scale)
Pays=[246,913,370,370,617,283]; residual=1

Vector 2 

B=10; w=[0.3333.., 0.3333.., 0.3333..] (scaled)
Pays=[3,3,3]; residual=1; residual sink gets 1

Appendix L — TLA+ Property Mapping Table

Safety 

P1 ↔ InvSplitSumOne
P2 ↔ InvCapSafe ∧ InvNonceMonotone
P7 ↔ InvFinalityOnly
P8 ↔ InvZKImpliesPolicy ∧ (multi‑gate conjunction)

Liveness 

P5 ↔ EnforcementLiveness with WF on inclusion actions

Appendix M — Operational Runbooks

Incident: false oracle report

  1. Freeze case; 2) request additional evidence; 3) resolve; 4) slash reporter; 5) publish post‑mortem.

Incident: subtree revoke

  1. Mark subtree; 2) notify parties; 3) validate no payouts to revoked nodes; 4) optional remediation path.

Appendix N — Upgradeability & Governance Controls

Proxy model

Prefer minimal proxies; lock logic contracts post‑audit. Parameter changes via registry; emergency pause with θ_E and strict timeout.

Timelocks

24h timelock on non‑emergency changes; on‑chain changelog with semantic versioning.

Appendix O — Network Profiles & Parameter Overlays

Ethereum L1

High gas; small batch windows; strict event packing.

L2s (OP, Base)

Cheaper gas; consider larger m per disbursement; same invariants.

App‑chains

Customize block times and finality thresholds; maintain proofs equivalently.

Appendix P — Asymptotics & Micro‑Benchmarks Plan

Asymptotics 

Splitter: O(m); Override: O(h); Combined: O(m+h)

Benchmark harness

Use Foundry fuzzing with gas snapshots across m ∈ [2,128], h ∈ [1,16]. Record 50th/95th/99th percentiles.

Appendix Q — Compliance Pack Examples (Policy Tags)

Examples

Age, Jurisdiction, RiskScoreτ, ContentRating, DeviceType, SubscriptionTier, DAG‑based multi‑stage.

Guideline

Minimize public inputs; push detail into the witness.

Appendix R — Logging & Data Availability

Receipts

Emit compact receipts referencing content‑addressed blobs (e.g., IPFS/Arweave) if needed.

Availability

Keep on‑chain Merkle anchors; DA layer optional for large analytics; pin retention policies.

Appendix S — Privacy Enhancements (Optional)

Differential privacy

Apply noise to analytics exports (not compliance predicates). Publish ε,δ if used.

Salt hygiene

Rotate salts for DID derivations; avoid reuse across ecosystems.

Appendix T — Formal Notation Quick Reference

Σ sum; Π product; ⌊x⌋ floor; ⇒ implies; ↔ iff; ⊤/⊥ true/false
[]P always; <>P eventually; P ~> Q leads‑to; /\ and; \/ or

Appendix U — Change Log (appendices pack)

v1.1 — Initial appendices pack: gas/cost, storage & ABI, ZK circuits & SRS, MEV/bridging, security trees, EV models, test vectors, TLA mapping, ops runbooks, upgradeability, network profiles, asymptotics, compliance packs, logging & DA, privacy, notation.

CHLOM™ Technical White Paper — Extended Appendices

Version 1.1 • August 10, 2025 • CrownThrive, LLC • [email protected] • Patent Pending

These appendices expand the main CHLOM Technical White Paper with deeper engineering detail. They add content and do not modify existing sections.

Appendix C — Gas‑Cost Budgeting & Complexity Envelopes (EVM focus)

Scope

Estimated gas envelopes assume Solidity 0.8.24, EVM Paris, warm SLOAD/SSTORE patterns, and pre‑hashed vectors/paths. Actual costs vary with m (recipients) and path length h.

Function envelopes (targets)

recordUsage (nonce check, cap guard, event only) 

O(1) state reads/writes; target 30–45k gas

disburse (Splitter + residual; no override tree) 

O(m) arithmetic; target ~11k base + 5k·m gas

disburseWithTree (Splitter + path‑product over height h) 

O(m + h) arithmetic; target ~13k base + 5k·m + 2.5k·h gas

revokeSubtree (mark nodes via mapping/bitmap; event) 

O(k) for k nodes updated; single‑root flag design ⇒ O(1) write, target 35–50k gas

submitViolation (with deposit transfer) 

O(1); target 30–40k gas (ex‑transfer)

resolveCase (slash/reward + state move) 

O(1); target 45–70k gas

Complexity summary 

Splitter payout:    O(m)
Override traversal: O(h)
Usage advance:      O(1)
Governance steps:   O(1)

Optimization notes

Pre‑hash weights and overridePath into bytes32. Use unchecked loops. Pack small fields to reduce SSTOREs. Emit single consolidated PayoutSettled with hashes.

Appendix D — Storage Layout & Slot Packing Strategy

Layout principles

  1. Hot vs cold: keep frequently touched fields in the same slot group.
  2. Pack: use
  3. Hash‑first: store hashes of large arrays/paths; keep canonical off‑chain artifacts.

Suggested packing (License) 

slot[0]: uint64 nonce | uint64 state | uint128 reserved
slot[1]: uint256 cap
slot[2]: uint256 used
slot[3]: bytes32 ownerDID
slot[4]: bytes32 weightsHash
slot[5]: bytes32 treeRoot

ABI & events 

event UsageAdvanced(bytes32 licenseId, uint256 delta, uint64 nonce, bytes32 verifierHash);
event PayoutSettled(bytes32 licenseId, uint256 base, bytes32 weightsHash, bytes32 overridePathHash, uint256 residual);

Index licenseId and verifierHash for fast audit queries.

Appendix E — ZK Circuit Specification (Interface & Constraints)

Interface 

Public inputs: policyTag, verifierHash, timestampBucket, actorDID
Witness: x (private usage data)
Guarantee: Verify(π, vk) = 1 ⇒ C(x) holds for policyTag; no leakage beyond validity

Constraint families (examples) 

Age ≥ 18:    x.birthdate + 18y ≤ nowBucket
Geo allow:   Poseidon(geoCode) ∈ MerkleRoot_allow
Risk bound:  score(x) ≤ τ  (rank‑1 constraints over fixed model)
KYC att:     hash(attestation) ∈ MerkleRoot_KYC

SRS & security level

Use a universal SRS (Plonkish) with ≥ 2^128 soundness. Publish vk hash on‑chain; rotate via Parameter Registry.

Appendix F — Trusted Setup, SRS Rotation, and vk Governance

Setup

Universal SRS ceremony or adoption from a reputable source. Document transcript and powers of tau.

Rotation

Version vk by content hash. Store active vk IDs in the Parameter Registry; allow emergency revoke/replace via DLA with θ_E.

Audits

Independent audits on circuits and transcript verification. Maintain reproducible builds for provers.

Appendix G — MEV & Ordering Analysis

Threat

Searchers reorder transactions to skew micro‑allocations or delay enforcement.

Defense

Batch‑order invariance (math): totals per recipient depend only on sums Σ_j w_i^(j) B_j. 

Formal: Σ over commutative monoid (ℝ_≥0, +) ⇒ permutation invariance

Receipts

Per‑tx receipts ensure disputants can verify inclusion even if micro‑level timing differs.

Appendix H — Cross‑Chain Bridging & Light‑Client Proofs

Design

Mint settlement artifacts on chain Y only upon verified finality proof from chain X.

Light clients (options) 

Ethereum→L2: beacon light client (SSZ root) with finalized header
IBC‑style: Tendermint light client with validator set changes
SPV: PoW/PoS headers + inclusion proofs (chain‑specific)

Safety

Bridge as additional assumption; slashing on relayer misbehavior; rate limits on mints.

Appendix I — Security Model & Attack Trees

High‑level trees 

Goal: Misallocate funds
  ├─ Splitter math bug → property tests block
  ├─ Override leak after revoke → subtree guard
  └─ Rounding drift → residual cap + audit

Goal: Bypass compliance
  ├─ Fake proof → on‑chain verifier
  ├─ vk swap → registry governance
  └─ Side‑channel → minimal public inputs

Goal: Censor enforcement
  ├─ Miner/validator collusion (<1/3) → liveness holds
  └─ >2/3 rewrite → economically irrational via slashing

Appendix J — Monte‑Carlo EV Models (Calibration)

Model 

Inputs: G ~ distribution; p_detect ~ Beta(α,β); s ~ policy; S ~ stake
EV = E[G] − E[p_detect] · s · S

Procedure

Sample 10k scenarios; ensure EV ≤ 0 at 95% CI. Publish recommended S for each role.

Appendix K — Test Vectors (Splitter & Rounding)

Vector 1 

B=1,234,567; w=[0.2,0.3,0.5] (1e18 scale)
Pays=[246,913,370,370,617,283]; residual=1

Vector 2 

B=10; w=[0.3333.., 0.3333.., 0.3333..] (scaled)
Pays=[3,3,3]; residual=1; residual sink gets 1

Appendix L — TLA+ Property Mapping Table

Safety 

P1 ↔ InvSplitSumOne
P2 ↔ InvCapSafe ∧ InvNonceMonotone
P7 ↔ InvFinalityOnly
P8 ↔ InvZKImpliesPolicy ∧ (multi‑gate conjunction)

Liveness 

P5 ↔ EnforcementLiveness with WF on inclusion actions

Appendix M — Operational Runbooks

Incident: false oracle report

  1. Freeze case; 2) request additional evidence; 3) resolve; 4) slash reporter; 5) publish post‑mortem.

Incident: subtree revoke

  1. Mark subtree; 2) notify parties; 3) validate no payouts to revoked nodes; 4) optional remediation path.

Appendix N — Upgradeability & Governance Controls

Proxy model

Prefer minimal proxies; lock logic contracts post‑audit. Parameter changes via registry; emergency pause with θ_E and strict timeout.

Timelocks

24h timelock on non‑emergency changes; on‑chain changelog with semantic versioning.

Appendix O — Network Profiles & Parameter Overlays

Ethereum L1

High gas; small batch windows; strict event packing.

L2s (OP, Base)

Cheaper gas; consider larger m per disbursement; same invariants.

App‑chains

Customize block times and finality thresholds; maintain proofs equivalently.

Appendix P — Asymptotics & Micro‑Benchmarks Plan

Asymptotics 

Splitter: O(m); Override: O(h); Combined: O(m+h)

Benchmark harness

Use Foundry fuzzing with gas snapshots across m ∈ [2,128], h ∈ [1,16]. Record 50th/95th/99th percentiles.

Appendix Q — Compliance Pack Examples (Policy Tags)

Examples

Age, Jurisdiction, RiskScoreτ, ContentRating, DeviceType, SubscriptionTier, DAG‑based multi‑stage.

Guideline

Minimize public inputs; push detail into the witness.

Appendix R — Logging & Data Availability

Receipts

Emit compact receipts referencing content‑addressed blobs (e.g., IPFS/Arweave) if needed.

Availability

Keep on‑chain Merkle anchors; DA layer optional for large analytics; pin retention policies.

Appendix S — Privacy Enhancements (Optional)

Differential privacy

Apply noise to analytics exports (not compliance predicates). Publish ε,δ if used.

Salt hygiene

Rotate salts for DID derivations; avoid reuse across ecosystems.

Appendix T — Formal Notation Quick Reference

Σ sum; Π product; ⌊x⌋ floor; ⇒ implies; ↔ iff; ⊤/⊥ true/false
[]P always; <>P eventually; P ~> Q leads‑to; /\ and; \/ or

Appendix U — Change Log (appendices pack)

v1.2 — Added gas snapshot & fuzz harness references (Appendix V), ZK circuit skeletons (Appendix W), prover benchmarking guide (Appendix X), and build scripts (Appendix Y). Download bundle linked in Appendix Z.

v1.1 — Initial appendices pack: gas/cost, storage & ABI, ZK circuits & SRS, MEV/bridging, security trees, EV models, test vectors, TLA mapping, ops runbooks, upgradeability, network profiles, asymptotics, compliance packs, logging & DA, privacy, notation.

Appendix V — Gas Snapshot & Fuzz Harness (Foundry)

Overview

This appendix defines how to run gas‑reporting and fuzz/property tests consistently across environments.

Commands 

forge test -vvv --gas-report
forge test --match-test Fuzz
forge snapshot

Targets

Gas envelopes are tracked for Splitter.payout() at m ∈ {3, 16}, and rounding conservation under fuzz (m ∈ [2,64], B ∈ [1,1e9]).

Expected outputs

--gas-report shows per‑function gas; tests also log gas_used_splitter_m3 and gas_used_splitter_m16.

Appendix W — ZK Circuit Skeletons (Circom & Noir)

Purpose

Provide minimal, auditable circuit templates that implement “age ≥ 18 AND geo ∈ allowlist” with a toy Poseidon‑based Merkle proof. Replace membership logic with production‑grade libraries before deployment.

Circom (age_geo_policy.circom) 

// circom 2.x
pragma circom 2.1.6;

include "circomlib/circuits/poseidon.circom";

// Policy: (age >= 18) AND (geoCode is member of Merkle allowlist)
template AgeGeoPolicy(nLeaves) {
    // Public
    signal input nowBucket;
    signal input root;          // Merkle root of allowlist
    signal input geoLeaf;       // Poseidon(geoCode)

    // Private
    signal input birthBucket;   // birth year bucket
    signal input pathElements[nLeaves];
    signal input pathIndex[nLeaves];

    // Check age
    signal ageOk;
    ageOk <== nowBucket - birthBucket >= 18;

    // Merkle membership (simplified; replace with proper component)
    var acc = geoLeaf;
    for (var i = 0; i < nLeaves; i++) {
        var left = (pathIndex[i] == 0) ? acc : pathElements[i];
        var right = (pathIndex[i] == 0) ? pathElements[i] : acc;
        acc = Poseidon(2)([left, right]);
    }
    acc === root;

    // Conjunction
    ageOk === 1;
}

component main = AgeGeoPolicy(16);

Noir (main.nr) 

// Noir 0.23+ style
fn main(now_bucket: u32, birth_bucket: u32, geo_leaf: Field, root: Field, path: [Field; 16], index: [u8; 16]) {
    // age check
    constrain(now_bucket - birth_bucket >= 18);

    // merkle membership (toy; replace with stdlib pedersen/poseidon merkle)
    let mut acc = geo_leaf;
    for i in 0..16 {
        let left = if index[i] == 0 { acc } else { path[i] };
        let right = if index[i] == 0 { path[i] } else { acc };
        acc = poseidon([left, right]);
    }
    constrain(acc == root);
}

Compile guidance

Circom: compile with circom age_geo_policy.circom --r1cs --wasm --sym and use snarkjs for setup/proving. Noir: nargo check / nargo prove per Noir toolchain.

Appendix X — Prover Benchmarking Guide

KPIs

Proof generation time (p50/p95), memory footprint, verifier gas cost, circuit size (constraints), trusted setup size.

Procedure

  1. Fix hardware and versions (compiler, libraries).
  2. Generate synthetic datasets covering typical witness sizes.
  3. Measure prove/verify over 30‑run medians; report CIs.
  4. Stress test max witness and path depths.

Reporting format 

Circuit, Constraints, Prove(ms), Verify(ms), Memory(MiB), VerifierGas
age_geo_policy, 18k, 120, 3.2, 512, 210k

Appendix Y — Build Scripts

Makefile targets 

.PHONY: test gas fuzz
test:
	forge test -vvv

gas:
	forge test -vvv --gas-report

fuzz:
	forge test --match-test Fuzz

CI advice

Pin solc and Foundry versions; cache out/ artifacts; fail build on gas regressions >5% vs baseline.

Appendix Z — Download Bundle

A consolidated zip contains the enhanced Foundry scaffold (gas + fuzz) and the ZK circuit skeletons (Circom + Noir).

CHLOM artifacts v2

Contents

  • foundry_chlom_scaffold_v2/
  • zk_circuits/circom/

Legal & Protective Notice

This BlackPaper documents proprietary algorithms, state machines, and economic designs for CHLOM. Uniqueness stems from the composition of ZK compliance gates, override‑tree payouts with subtree revocation guarantees, batch‑order invariance, and calibrated staking/slashing proving negative EV for deviations.

All rights reserved. CrownThrive, LLC. Patent Pending.

Was this article helpful?

AI-Powered Decentralized Compliance, Licensing, and Ownership Model™ The Next Evolution in Automated Compliance & Governance
CHLOM™ White Paper